Modellings for Belief Change: Prioritization and Entrenchment by Rott, Hans
Modellings for belief change: 
Prioritization and entrenchment* 
by 
H A N S R O T T 
University of Konstanz 
7. Introduction 
LI, Representation of beliefs 
OUR MODEL OF belief wil l be a simple one. A belief is represented 
by a sentence in some (regimented) language. Research done in 
Art if icial Intelligence has recently lead to a revival of the logic of 
belief. It was felt that a clear distinction should be drawn between 
the explicit and the implicit beliefs of a reasoner [15, 19]. The 
former ones are those that the reasoner would assent to i f asked 
and for which he has some kind of independent warrant. The 
latter ones are those that follow, by some specified logic, from the 
set of explicit beliefs. 
We distinguish a belief base, the set of explicit beliefs, from a 
belief set. A belief set is closed under logical consequences, it is a 
theory in the logician's sense. In general, we conceive of belief sets 
as generated by belief bases. Let us say that H is a belief base for 
the belief set K if and only i f K is the set of all logical consequences 
o f / / , i.e., i f K= Cn{H). 
We must make a decision what to count as a belief state. A 
belief state is that kind of thing, pre-theoretically understood, 
which is changed when we change our beliefs. A s we cannot read 
off from a belief set K which beliefs in it are the explicit ones, a 
belief state cannot be just a belief set. Should we say that a belief 
state is modelled by a belief base HI O f course, we then have no 
problem in generating the full belief set, provided we have fixed an 
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appropriate logic Cn. However, as we shall see, there is a dynami-
cal problem with this conception. In the sort of changes we shall 
consider, we cannot satisfy two desiderata at the same time: the 
desideratum that the changed belief state can be characterized by a 
belief base, and the desideratum that this belief base contains the 
set of explicit beliefs after the change has been effected. This is an 
unpleasant state of affairs which we shall have to put up with in 
this paper. Giving an answer to our question, we say that a belief 
state is a pair (if, K) such that i f is a belief base for K. However, 
the reader be warned that our change operations are not making 
belief states out of belief states in response to a certain input. We 
shall explain this in the next section. 
Before doing that, let us delineate the object language and its 
logic. The logic of belief change, and especially the theory of 
epistemic entrenchment, has been discussed for a language with 
the expressiveness of propositional logic, including all its connec-
tives -», A , V , —• and <-•, as well as the truth and falsity constants T 
and _L. In contrast to this, we will aim at reducing the linguistic 
prerequisites. Our considerations are to apply also to systems us-
ing severely restricted languages, as encountered e.g. in inheritance 
nets or truth (reason) maintenance systems. 
Correspondingly, the logic governing our language has to obey 
only structural rules. We require that it be reflexive, monotonic, 
transitive, and compact. We refer to our logic either as a conse-
quence operator Cn or as an inference relation h , with the usual 
understanding that 0 e Cn{H) iff i f h</>. In the first notation our 
four requirements become 
(R) i f C Cn(H) 
(M) If H C i f ' then Cn(H) C Cn{H') 
(T) Cn(Cn(H)) C Cn(H) 
(C) If 0 € Cn(H) then <p e Cn{Hr) for some finite subset i f ' of H 
When linking our considerations to earlier work, we shall make 
use of connectives. Then the logic is further supposed to be 
supraclassical, i.e., what follows classically from a given premise 
set should follow from it in Cn. We also assume that Cn satisfies 
the deduction theorem. 
7.2. Dynamics 
A belief change occurs i f a belief state is changed in order to ac-
commodate it to a certain input. In the case we are going to deal 
with, the input comes in the form of (explicit) beliefs. In the re-
search program initiated by Alchourron, Gardenfors and 
Makinson ([3]; for excellent surveys, see [7] and [17]), belief states 
are identified with belief sets, and inputs are single sentences. Stil l 
working in broadly the same research program, Fuhrmann [5, 6] 
and Hansson [10, 11, 12] offer modellings for two important gen-
eralizations. They investigate what happens when belief states are 
modelled as belief bases (with belief sets as special cases) and when 
the input comes in sets of sentences (with singletons as special 
cases). In short, they generalize the theory of belief change to base 
changes and multiple changes. 
It is clear from the very beginning that the idea of base change 
is indeed compelling. True, it is reasonable to say that what an 
agent really believes is the belief set K, including the full set of his 
implicit beliefs. But it is at least as reasonable to think of belief 
change operations as acting on the set of explicit beliefs alone. A f -
ter all , merely implicit beliefs have a secondary status, they are 
derived from the explicit ones. A n d i f some of the explicit beliefs 
they depend on should have to give way, so should they! What 
counts in belief revision is the explicit beliefs, and later we shall 
provide for the possibility that they count in varying degrees. This 
is a foundationalist picture of belief revision and contrasts with 
the coherentist picture predominant in the current theory of belief 
revision [8, 14]. We will endorse the philosophy of base change in 
this paper. 
Again, it is a good idea to be ready for set-like inputs. But this 
issue does not seem to have the same philosophical force as base 
contraction. Philosophically, base change is an alternative to 
theory change, while multiple change is just an extension of single-
ton change. There seems to be no intimate connection between 
these two kinds of deviation from the original framework of 
Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson. However, we shall argue 
that multiple belief changes play a significant role in the analysis 
of base changes. 
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L3. Three types of belief change 
The simplest type of belief change is the addition of a new belief <j>\ 
(or a set of beliefs) which is consistent with the old beliefs. In this 
case, we have no problem in identifying the relevant operations. 
We can effect theory change through base change. Using the sym-
bol '+', we define consistent additions as follows: 
H+(p= #U{0} 
K+</> = Cn(KU{<l)}) 
Notice that has two different meanings here, depending on 
whether its first argument is supposed to be a belief base or a 
belief set. It is obvious how to generalize these definitions when 
the input comes in sets. However, as the generalization will be far 
from obvious in the remaining cases, we shall restrict ourselves to 
singleton inputs in the rest of this section. 
The operation of accommodating a belief state to some input is 
considerably more difficult i f the latter is inconsistent with the 
former. In this case, it is usually held that consistency should act 
as an integrity constraint for our belief system. For such belief-
contravening additions, we shall adopt the following idea: In order 
to rationally include 0 into the set H (or K) of your beliefs, first 
make H (or K) consistent with 0, i.e., recant the commitment to 
-"•</>, and then add 0 consistently to the resulting set. It is common 
to use the term 'revision9 to cover both consistent and belief-con-
travening additions, and to use the symbols V for revisions and 
' for contractions. The above idea which is credited to Isaac 
Levi in the literature then becomes: 
H*(j> = (H^-^ip) + 0 = (H^^(j))U {0} 
K*(j)= (AT- 2—0) + 0 = O i ( ( A ' J - - 0 ) U {0}) 
This is the Levi identity, in its two versions for base and for 
theory change. One may think that the Levi identity is not of 
much help as long as we do not know how the contraction opera-
tion — behaves. This is right, but still it reduces the problem of 
finding suitable revision operations to the problem of finding suit-
able contraction operations. Philosophically, contraction appears 
to be the more fundamental operation. Like most authors in belief 
revision, we shall follow Levi's advice and concentrate on the 
study of belief contractions in the following. 1 
What is this fundamental interesting operation called 'contrac-
tion'? The contraction of a set of beliefs with respect to an input 
sentence 0 is a subset of the original beliefs which does not logi-
cally imply 0. (Tn a sense, "input sentences" for contractions are 
rather "output sentences".) In case we start with a belief set K, we 
should end up with another belief set K— 0 which is logically 
closed again. In contrast to the case of additions, we do not want 
to stipulate that the contracted belief set K— 0 can always be iden-
tified with the set of logical consequences of a new belief base 
77— 0. We will explain why presently. 
1.4. The basic idea of minimal change 
When forced to perform a belief change, it seems a rational maxim 
to preserve as many of the most important beliefs as possible. 
Many writers have embraced such a condition of minimal change 
(minimum mutilation, maximal conservativity, informational 
economy) for many different purposes [18]. We will use the label 
'minimal change approach' as a proper name for an account of 
belief revision which covers at least maxichoice, full, and partial 
meet contraction in the sense of Alchourron, Gardenfors and 
Makinson [3]. 
This is the basic idea of minimal change: In order to contract a 
belief base 77 (or a belief set K) with respect to 0, look at the maxi-
mal subsets of 77 (of K) which do not imply 0. Since every piece of 
information is valuable, no gratuitous loss of beliefs is tolerated. 
As a first shot, then, we say that a set 77, of beliefs is better than, 
or preferred to, a set H2, relative to the belief base 77, if 77, pre-
serves more explicit beliefs than 772, that is, i f 77^  n 77 is a proper 
subset of 77, n 77. In this case we write 772 < 77,. If 77, and 772 are 
subsets of 77, this of course reduces to 772 C77,. Proper inclusion is 
1 However, it is not easy to formulate analogues of the Levi identity for "pick" 
and "bunch revisions" in the sense explained below. 
a crude preference relation for sets of beliefs, but it is the best— 
because the only—thing we can do, as long as the syntactical 
structure of the belief base is supposed to be the only information 
available for belief change. We write HAcf) for the set of all -<-
maximal or "best" subsets of H which fail to imply 0. As we shall 
presently consider more sophisticated preference relations -<, we 
occasionally use Alchourron and Makinson's [1] notation Hlcj) 
rather than HA<p in order to mark the cases where •< is supposed to 
be fixed as proper inclusion (relativized to H). 
L5. Base contraction 
In the following, the term 'base contraction' is not to be taken lit-
erally. What is changed is the theory K - Cn{H) generated by a 
base H. But how the theory is changed depends on the way it is 
axiomatized, on the structure of H. For instance, while H - {p,q} 
and H' - {pAq} generate the same theory K, we expect that K—p 
contains q if K is axiomatized by / / , but that q is lost if K is 
axiomatized by H\ In the latter case, q is inseparable from p. 
The minimal change approach is afflicted with a decisive diffi-
culty. In general, there is more than one solution to the minimal 
change problem, i.e., more than one maximal set of beliefs which 
does not imply <p. The point is that there is usually more than just 
one member in HAfy. What then to do? We adopt an egalitarians's 
point of view. A l l elements of HA(p are to be treated equally. 
The hold or credulous option is maxichoice base change: In or-
der to eliminate <p from K, choose one element of HAcj) at random, 
and close under Cn. 
DEFINITION 1. Let H be a base for K and y be a (single-valued) 
choice function which selects, for every nonempty set HA(j), an arbi-
trary element of HA<j). Then the maxichoice base contraction over 
K determined by H and y is given by 
y/eK-'-if) iff \r <l> and y{HA<p) H y/, or h0 and y/eK. 
Being maximally conservative, maxichoice contraction comes as 
close to the idea of minimal change as possible. However, i f we do 
not have any tie-breaking information to govern the choice of 
some particular element of HA(j), there is no guarantee that the 
randomizing function y selects "the right" one. Believers do not 
play dice. The arbitrariness of maxichoice contractions is avoided 
by the next model for belief revision. 
The skeptical option is meet base change: In order to eliminate 
(j) from K, take all the elements of HA(j), then close each under Cn, 
and finally take the intersection.2 
DEFINITION 2. For any base H for K, the meet contraction over K 
determined by H is given by 
if/eK~(/> iff HQ and H'r-y for every H'eHAfy, 
or \-(f) and yeK. 
Meet contractions depart from the idea of minimal change, be-
cause the intersection of several maximal non-implying subsets 
under -< is not itself a maximal non-implying subset under <. 
However, a symmetrical consideration of each element of HA<p 
is required by our decision to let in no other information than is 
encoded in the structure of the explicit beliefs. Opting for meet 
contraction thus means adhering to the equality of rights of the 
members in HAQ. 
Alchourron and Makinson [1] have shown that meet contrac-
tions make good sense only if either < allows for finer discrimi-
nations than C or H is a non-theory. If we have only syntactical 
information at our disposal, i.e., i f every datum in the belief base 
carries the same epistemic weight, then it is essential for the fol-
lowing constructions that we have a differentiation between ex-
plicit and implicit beliefs. In this case the distinction is not only 
desirable intuitively, but also a technical prerequisite. 
It would not be quite right to characterize our proposals as 
2 Specializing -< to C, we get a method which is applied by Veltman [29] and 
Kratzer [13] for the analysis of counterfactuals, and by Poole [22] for 
nonmonotonic reasoning. For more connections with the latter area of research, 
see Ncbel [21]. 
"theory change through base change" [6]. We do not want to 
stipulate that K^-(j) = Cn(H~(j)) for some appropriate H— 0. 
Let us illustrate why. Consider H-{p,q} and retract pAq from 
K=Cn(H). T h e n / 7 ± ( / ? A t f ) = {{/?},{#}}, so under K^-Q^Cn{H^(p), 
maxichoice would give us either K—{pAq)~Cn{{p}) or K—{pAq) 
-Cn{{q}), while meet would give us K—{pAq)-Cn{Qi). Neither of 
these solutions seems satisfactory. Intuitively, K-^(pAq)-
Cn({pVq}) would be good. Even after conceding that one of p and 
q may be false, we should still cling to the belief that the other one 
is true. But H'={pVq} is no base which can be constructed natu-
rally from H—it certainly does not record any explicit belief. We 
are faced with a deep-seated dilemma. Either we must give up the 
philosophy of base changes which identifies the elements of a be-
lief base with explicit beliefs, or else violate the methodological 
principle of categorial matching which requires that the result of a 
belief change should be of the same format as the initial represen-
tation of our beliefs.3 In this paper we are going to stick to the in-
terpretation of bases as explicit beliefs. Wi th a heavy heart, we 
forgo the aim of getting {K—fa H—(j)) from (K9H) and stay content 
with the more modest aim of getting K—0 from K with the help of 
the belief base H. We assume that the belief base H and the order-
ing -< of its subsets induced by the idea of minimal change are rel-
evant, and indeed all that is relevant, for the construction of 
from K, but neither H nor the ordering of its subsets will get re-
vised itself. Pictorially, instead of the desirable transition (K,H,<) 
A (K— 0, H— 0, <*) we will study the transition K t-? K—0. In 
particular, there will be no suggestion as to the contents of H—0. 
1.6. Multiple contraction 
When the input comes in sets, we are presented with two different 
kinds of contraction. The task of a pick contraction is to discard 
at least one element of a set 5, while the task of a bunch contrac-
tion is to discard each element of a set S, both times with minimal 
mutilation of the original belief state.4 In conformity with the 
3 This principle is necessary and sufficient for a modelling of iterated revisions. 
basic idea of minimal change, we again focus on maximal non-im-
plying subsets of H. 
Let HA(s) be the set of all maximal subsets of H under -< which 
do not imply every element of S, and HA[S] the set of all maximal 
subsets of H under -< which do not imply any element of S. 
Clearly, / / A ( { 0 } } = HA[{<p}] = / / A 0 . We will drop curly brackets 
within pointed and square brackets, so K—[{fay/}] will simplify to 
£ ^ [ 0 , y ] i and 7/A({0,y/j) to HA((j>,y/\ etc. 
Notice that HA^y) = / / A ( 0 A ^ ) . But there are no interesting 
analogues for HA[<j),y/]. It seems that pick contractions with re-
spect to finite sets are reducible to contractions of conjunctions, 
but that bunch contractions cannot easily be reduced to singleton 
contractions.5 
The concepts of maxichoice and meet contraction determined 
by a belief base can be generalized naturally to cover pick and 
bunch contractions as well. As the case of maxichoice contractions 
is entirely analogous, we restrict ourselves to meet contractions. 
Borrowing Fuhrmann's [5] symbols, we introduce 
DEFINITION 3. For any base H for Kf the pick and bunch versions 
of multiple meet contraction over K determined byH are defined as 
follows: 
4 Andre Fuhrmann [5] was probably the first to study pick and bunch contrac-
tions. He called them choice and meet contractions. For danger of confusion with 
maxichoice and (full, partial) meet contraction, we introduce new names. 
5 We note some special cases for -< = C. For theories K and sentences 0 and i/f such 
that at least one of 0 and y/ is in K, K 1 (0 V y/) C K l[0,y/]. For the proof of this 
and related things, the following fact is relevant: For every theory K, every K' e 
KL<p and every y/and x m K—K\ it holds that \jf~x G K'- This in turn is due to the 
fact that for every such K, K' and % it holds that (i) iff-* 0 e A" (Proof: K' h yi~»0, 
by maximality, so y/—>0 e K\ by y/—>0 e K [theory!] and maximality) and (ii) 0—>y/ 
6 K' (Proof: since K' \r 0, we get A" ^ (0—1//)— 0, so K U {<j>-+yf} tf 0, so 0—-y/€ K\ by 
0—>y eK [theory!] and maximality). However, in general A±[0,y/| (ZAT1 (0 V y/) 
even if A" is a theory; consider K - Cn({p,q}), for which K ±-[p,q] = {Cn(p V q), 
Cn(p~q)}t but K 1 (p V q) = {Cn(p~q)}. And HL (0 V y/) C HI [0,y] breaks 
down for non-theories / / ; just consider H = {p,q,p V q}, for which HI (p V q) - {0 
J and HI \p,q\ = {{pvq}}. 
yeK^{s) iff H'hy for every //'G//A(S)*0, 
or H A (s) = 0 and I//G .^ 
y e £ ^ [ S ] iff ff'hy for every H' e H A [5] * 0, 
or H A [5] = 0 and y e K. 
2. Prioritization 
A t the end of Section 1.4 we expressed some dissatisfaction with 
the crudeness of the preference relation afforded there. This crude-
ness was due to our assumption that we only have syntactical in-
formation governing changes of belief. N o w let us suppose that we 
do have more information. In every realistic situation, the ele-
ments of a belief base will differ in epistemic weight. Some of them 
are more important, more relevant, more plausible, more valuable, 
or more certain than others. Without fixing the precise interpreta-
tion, we can model this by a weak ordering (an asymmetric and 
modular 6 relation) <3 of the elements of / / . The strict relation <3 
may be thought of as the asymmetric part of a transitive and con-
nected relation <l, or as being determined by an assignment of real 
numbers to the elements of H. The modularity of <1 essentially 
means that the relation X I of incomparability (</> X y iff neither 
<j) < y nor y < </>) is an equivalence relation and can thus be re-
garded as the relation of being tied or identical. 
After Nebel [21], we understand by a level of priority (in 
NebePs terms, a "degree of epistemic relevance") in a base H an 
equivalence class in H with respect to X 3 . Levels of priority will 
be denoted by 0 , where (p is an arbitrary representative of {y EH\ 
y\X\(f)}. A level of priority <f) is higher than a level of priority y/, in 
symbols y<i<j), iff y<i(p. It is clear that the ordering <1 between 
levels of priority is well-defined. The ordering < of H generates a 
new ordering -< of the powerset of / / , and indeed a new ordering 
of all sets of sentences: 
DEFINITION 4. H'<H" iff there is a level of priority (p in H such that 
H'n(j) C H"C\ty and for all higher levels of priority y in H we have 
Hoy c H"n y 
6 A relation <1 is modular if 0<3i// entails that either 0<]^ o r f ° r every X-
Modularity and asymmetry entail transitivity. 
It is easy to check that H'<H" just in case there is a (p in H"-H' 
such that y/<!0 for all y/ in H'-H". Definition 4, and in fact the 
entire method of prioritized base contraction, is very much in line 
with Reseller's "plausibility-tropic" Fundamental Rule of Pre-
sumption: " A positive presumption always favors the most plausi-
ble contentions among the available alternatives. It must stand 
until set aside by something yet more plausible..." 7[24, p.55] 
From now on, HA<p and HA[S] again denote the set of all maxi-
mal or "best" subsets of H which fail to imply 0, or respectively, 
any element of [5], but maximality is now judged by the new pref-
erence relation <. These concepts generalize Alchourron and 
Makinson's set Hl(j) which does not provide for differences in 
epistemic weight. If a belief base is not prioritized, i.e., i f < is 
empty, then < coincides with C (relativized to / / ) , and we get the 
so-called full meet base contraction as a limiting case. The basic 
idea of prioritized base contraction (Nebel) is to focus on HAcp 
when looking for the rational way of discarding </>. This is a re-
interpretation of what we called meet contraction in Definition 2. 
Although it would in the case of (genuinely) prioritized belief 
bases be somewhat more suggestive to talk of "rational choices" 
or "best solutions" or "optimal selections" we shall continue to 
say that we follow the basic idea of minimal change. 
The relation we have generated has the following properties: 
OBSERVATION 1. The relation < is 
(i) a weak partial order (i.e., irreflexive and transitive), 
(ii) base-specific in the sense that H'<H" iff H'C\H<H" iff 
H<H"C\H, 
(Hi) maximizing in the sense that H'nHCH"riHentails H'<H". 
7 The procedure described in Rescher [23, pp. 50-51] is even more explicit. It is 
interesting, however, that Rescher in both [23, p. 46] and [24, pp. 15-16] requires 
his plausibility indexing to satisfy conditions similar to the ones used in the char-
acterization of epistemic entrenchment. This is not at all necessary (neither is it 
detrimental, see Nebel [21, Theorem 9]). Also cf. Gardenfors and Makinson [7, 
p. 88]: "The guiding idea for the construction is that when a knowledge system K 
is revised or contracted, the sentences given up are those having the lowest degrees 
of epistemic entrenchment". 
If <3 is conversely well-founded (no infinite ascending chains), then 
< is 
(iv) stoppered in the sense that for every H'(ZH such that 
CniH^nS = 0 there is an H"eHA[S] such that H" = K or 
H'<H". 
If <l is not conversely well-founded, then < may fail to be stoppered, 
even for singleton S. 
Proof Irreflexivity, transitivity, base-specificity and the maxi-
mizing property follow trivially from Definition 4. 
Stopperedness: Assume that Cn{H)C\S-% and that < is con-
versely well-founded. Since <3 is assumed to be modular, <3 over 
the levels of priority is a converse well-ordering, and thus con-
versely isomorphic to a unique ordinal T. Every level of priority y/ 
can be associated with a unique ordinal <7<r, with smaller ordinals 
marking higher levels of priority. The level of priority with rank 
number o will be denoted y/o. If G<T and Ha is a set such that 
Cn(Ho) 0 5 = 0 , then let Ha be an arbitrary inclusion maximal sub-
set of \jfa such that Cn(Ha U / / £ ) n S = 0 . By the compactness and 
monotonicity of Cn, such Ho's are easily shown to exist. They en-
ter into our construction of H" for stopperedness as follows: 
Ha+\ — HaU Ha 
Ha - | J {HP: p<o) for limit ordinals <x 
Finally, we put H" = | J {Ha: cr<r}. It is clear from the construc-
tion that either H'<H" or H" = H\ and that H" is in HA\S\ And 
it follows from the compactness and monotonicity of Cn that 
for every <7<r, Cn(Ha)nS = 0, and thus that Cn(H")nS = 0. This 
completes the proof of the stopperedness of <. 
If < is not required to be well-founded, then -< need not be 
stoppered, even in the case of a singleton S. We consider a 
propositional language with denumerably many atoms p, q p q„ 
q 3 , q 4 , ... and the belief base H = {qVq^: ij = 1,2,3,..., / * j} U 
{q. — • / ? : / = 1,2,3,...} and ask for HA[p]. The prioritization is to 
be such that for all /, j, k (j * k) we have q-^p < q.Vqk and for 
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all i<j we have q-+p <i qr-*p. Every ^-maximal subset of H 
which does not imply /; must contain {qVq.: />/}, because the 
disjunctions enjoy high priorities in H. A n d we are allowed to add 
exactly one material implication q.-^p without getting p. But since 
we are facing the infinite ascending chain <l q2—+p <! q—>p 
<\ q4—>p there is no -(-maximal subset of H to accomplish the 
removal of p. Q . E . D . 8 
By the maximizing property, HA[S] C HJL[S], The new prefer-
ence relation < admits finer distinctions than proper set inclu-
sions.9 In the following we shall abstract from the special origin of 
the preference relation < between subsets of / / , that is, from the 
fact that -< was generated from <1 by the above construction. In-
stead we shall just draw on the properties of < mentioned in Ob-
servation 1. In particular, we assume that -< is stoppered. Our level 
of generality thus lies somewhere between that of Nebel [20, 21] 
and that of Hansson [12] who studies the still more abstract tool 
of selection functions. We shall always point out which of the 
properties we need for which of the things to prove. 
Generalizing our notion of preference a bit, we say that a set 
3f] of sets of sentences is better than (or preferred to) a set J~T2 of 
sets of sentences, in symbols 3f2^<Jfr i f for every H2 in 3f2 
there is an 77, in with H2<Hy 
* This example disproves a claim of Nebel [21, p. 56]. A similar counterexample 
has independently been provided by Wcydert [30, p. 131]. 
9 The importance of the maximizing property has been stressed repeatedly in the 
work of Sven Ovc Hansson.—If base contractions arc supplemented by a recov-
ery-guaranteeing appendage (sec Section 6.2.2 below) and if everything is Unite, 
prioritization is formally superfluous. It is shown in [28, Theorem 7] that then 
every prioritized base contraction can be simulated by a suitably chosen 
unprioritized belief base. But the simple bases to be used are grossly unintuitive. 
Consider for example the base / / = {/?, p—*q\ with the alternative prioritizations 
p—*q <3 p and /? < p—*q. In the former case, / / , = {pAq, p, pVq, <:/—•/?}, while in 
the latter case, II2 = {q, p*-*q}, both without prioritization, will lead to precisely 
the same results as the prioritized belief base / / . In neither case is there anything 
like a transparent connection with the original base / / . 
3. Epistemic entrenchment 
The concept of epistemic entrenchment has turned out to be a 
natural and fruitful instrument for the analysis of belief change [7, 
8, 9, 16, 25, 26, 27]. 'Epistemic entrenchment' is just another word 
for comparative retractability. Intuitively, <p<y/ means that it is 
easier to discard </> than to discard y/. We may call this the basic 
idea of epistemic entrenchment. Below we shall offer two interpre-
tations of this idea in order to make it more precise. 
The relation between epistemic entrenchment and prioritization 
in a belief base has been first investigated by Bernhard Nebel. Ini-
tially he claimed that the latter is "fundamentally different" from 
the former [20, p. 308] but recently he changed his mind in favour 
of an interpretation of epistemic entrenchment as a special case of 
prioritization [21, pp. 53, 68, 85]. We will join the former opinion 
in this paper. F rom the fact that 0 has a higher priority than y/ we 
may not infer that </> is better entrenched than y/, nor may we rely 
on the reverse inference.1 0 This is true at least when an entrench-
ment relation is built up from a prioritized belief base in what we 
shall claim is the most natural fashion. 
The most conspicuous difference, however, is that epistemic en-
trenchment relations are to respect the logical relationships be-
tween the beliefs in question, a feature that is completely absent in 
the concept of belief base priorities. The basic postulates an 
epistemic entrenchment relation < has to satisfy are: 
(EE1) T ^ T (Non-Triviality) 
(EE2 1) i f (jxy/and y/\~X-> t h e n (t)<X (Continuing Up) 
(EE2 1) if <j)< yf and ^ h 0 , then x < W (Continuing Down) 
(EE3 ( ) i f </><!//-and then (p<y/Ax (Conjunction Up) 
(EE3 1) if 0 A y/< y/, then (jxys (Conjunction Down) 
See the counterexample against (EE6) in the proof of Observation 5 below. 
There is an equivalent and more economical set of postulates 
which does not refer to any connective of the object language. 
First, we can replace Non-Triviality by irreflexivity. Second, we 
note that postulates (EE2 !) and (EE3T) taken together are equiva-
lent to (EE 1), while (EE2 1) and (EE3 1) taken together are equivalent 
to (EE 1) [27]: 
(EE1) i f 0<y/Tor every y/'m a non-empty set S and S then 
4><X 
(EE1) if </><yfand {y/, then %<yf . 
The set of basic postulates may be supplemented by the following 
ones. 
(EE4) if / / i s consistent, then: _L<0 iff / / h 0 (Minimality) 
(EE5) iff/0, thentfxT (Maximality) 
(EE6) if 0<y/, then (f)<x or x<¥ (Modularity) 
Again purely structural formulations of (EE4) and (EE5) are pos-
sible by substituting 'there is a y/'such that y/<(j) (such that (jxy/Y 
for '!<</>' (for ' 0 < T ' ) . For the motivation and discussion of all 
these postulates, see Gardenfors and Makinson [9] and Rott [27]. 
Epistemic entrenchment relations are required to satisfy (EE1) -
(EE30 in [27], and in addition (EE4) - (EE6) in [9]. (In fact, 
Gardenfors and Makinson work with a non-strict relation < which 
can be obtained from the strict relation < by taking the converse 
complement.) 
Given a relation of epistemic entrenchment, how can we get a 
contraction function from it? For the principal case, where (j>eK 
and 0 < T , the standard definition [9, 27] is 
DEFINITION 5. For any relation < of epistemic entrenchment, the 
large EE-contraction with respect to < is given by 
y/eK—ij) iff y/eK, and (fxcpVy/or h 0 
The presence of the disjunction <pvy/ here is somewhat mysteri-
ous (to say the least). A n alternative idea was ventilated in Rott 
[25]: 
DEFINITION 6. For any relation < of epistemic entrenchment, the 
small EE-contraction with respect to < is given by 
y/eK^(j) iff y/e K, and (jxy/or \-(j) 
Strictly speaking, both definitions ought to be supplemented by 
a clause stating that K^-(j) =K if (j) £ K or (j)<T, but as this would 
not make a difference for the following, we omit it. 
Both Definition 5 and Definition 6 make sure that K~<j) is 
a theory and that the contraction function — satisfies a number 
of rationality postulates. Large EE-contractions, but not small 
EE-contractions, satisfy the so-called postulate of recovery: A^C 
(K- <p) + 0 . 
It follows from (EE2 T) that K— 0 according to Definition 6 is a 
subset of K — <j) according to Definition 5—whence the names. 
Lindstrom and Rabinowicz [16, Section 5] argue convincingly to 
the effect that given an epistemic entrenchment relation <, any 
reasonable contraction of K with respect to 0 should result in a 
belief set which includes the small and is included in the large EE-
contraction. 
The basic idea of epistemic entrenchment is as yet still very 
vague and ought to be made more precise. The first or competitive 
interpretation of it suggests to determine the relative ease of re-
tracting a sentence by looking at the fate of <p and y/ in a direct 
competition between 0 and yf. It reconstructs epistemic entrench-
ment from observed contraction behaviour [9, 27]: 
DEFINITION 7. For any contraction function — over K, the epistemic 
entrenchment relation revealed by — is given by 
(jxyr iff y/e K^((j)Ay/) and <p e K — ( 0 A y / ) . 
Definition 7 yields extremely nice results when coupled with large 
EE-contraction functions over a theory K. If the contraction func-
tion — satisfies certain rationality postulates, then < as obtained 
by Definition 7 is a relation of epistemic entrenchment from which 
we can recover — with the help of Definition 5. A n d conversely, if 
< is a relation of epistemic entrenchment, then — as obtained by 
Definition 5 satisfies certain rationality postulates and permits a 
reconstruction of < with the help of Definition 7. Details of that 
interplay can be found in Gardenfors and Makinson [9] and Rott 
[27]. 
Another virtue of Definition 5 is the following. Nebel [21, proof 
of Theorem 9] showed that entrenchment relations satisfying 
(EE1) - (EE6) can be used as prioritizations of belief .ve/.v in the 
sense that they yield, via Definitions 2 and 4, the same result as 
when applied in Definition 5.1 1 
In [27], I emphatically adopt the idea that K-^((j)A y/) is to be in-
terpreted as a multiple contraction, viz. the pick contraction with 
respect to { 0 , y/}. Contracting AT with respect to 0 A if/, I argued, is 
exactly the same as retracting at least one of 0 and y/. In symbols, 
K^(<j)Ay/) = K—(<j),y/). The motivation of Definition 7 is then 
clear. If you have to give up either 0 or y/, and you give up 0 and 
keep y/, then y/ has been more entrenched than 0 . 
I do not see any intuitive reason for supposing that the identity 
K^((j)Ay/) -K—{^y/) is inadequate in some applications. Still it 
is good to be prepared for this possibility. Another motive for 
modifying Definition 7 is that we want to avoid an explicit men-
tioning of particular connectives, in order to make the epistemic 
entrenchment approach applicable to restricted languages as en-
countered for instance in semantic networks. We take the motiva-
tion of Definition 7 seriously and suggest the following improve-
ment: 
11. An analogous applicability of entrenchment relations for so-called safe con-
tractions is established in [26, Theorem 4(ii)]. Entrenchment relations are so well-
behaved that they appear to be appropriate for every contraction method without 
changing the results. 
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DEFINITION 8. For any contraction function — over K, the epistemic 
entrenchment relation revealed by — is given by 
(jxy/ iff if/ E K^-((j),y/) and (p g K~((p,yf). 
This interpretation of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment 
builds on the concept of pick contraction. Let us now try to deal 
with prioritized base contractions in terms of epistemic entrench-
ment. 
4. Prioritized base contractions as extended epistemic 
entrenchment contractions 
We extend the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment to sets of sen-
tences. From now on, \S)<{T)* is intended to mean that it is 
easier to discard some element of S than to discard some element 
of 7 \ ' [ S J ^ I T ] ' is intended to mean that it is easier to discard all 
elements of S than to discard all elements of T. We shall speak of 
extended epistemic entrenchment in the sequel, with the two types 
pick and bunch entrenchment. 
Let us try to widen the competitive interpretation of epistemic 
entrenchment accordingly. For pick entrenchment, this is easy. 
The obvious suggestion is 
{S)<^{T) iff TCK^-(SUT) and SaK^(SUT). 
But for bunch entrenchment, there is no sensible condition which 
can be formalized with the present means.1 2 
So we propose another understanding of—possibly extended— 
epistemic entrenchment. The second or minimal change interpreta-
tion of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment builds on the basic 
idea of minimal change. It reads 'is easier' as 'does not require as 
great an informational loss as' or 'sacrifices less important beliefs 
than'. Formally, preference is judged by the relation of Section 
2. Let us define the following version of extended epistemic en-
trenchment: 
12. We do not wish to employ unheard-of objects such as K~([S],[T\). 
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DEFINITION 9. For any base H for K, the relation <^ of bunch 
entrenchment generated by H is defined by 
[ S ] « [ 7 1 iff for every H'C H such that O i ( / T ) n T = 0 
there is an H"QH such that H'<H" and Cn(H")nS - 0, 
and \i yf for every yf in 5. 
The following equivalent formulation is sometimes more con-
venient: 
OBSERVATION 2. Let H be a base for K, and <^ be the bunch en-
trenchment generated by H. Then [S]^[T] iff for every H'eHA[T\ 
there is an H"e HA [S] such that H'<H'\ and HA[S] * 0, i.e., iff 
HA[T]«HA[S]*Q. 
Proof F rom left to right. Take an H' from i / A [ T ] . Since 
O ? ( / f ) n T = 0, the left hand side tells us that there is an H" such 
that Cn(H")nS -Q and H'<H". By stopperedness, there is an H* 
in HA[S] such that either H*~H" or H"<H\ By transitivity, we 
have H'<H\ as desired. N o w suppose that 7/A[S]=0. Then, by 
stopperedness, there is no H'CH such that C«(/ /")n 5 = 0. Since 
we can take H'= 0, this entails that there is a y/ in 5 such that h y/. 
F r o m right to left. Take an / T C i / s u c h that Cn(H')n T = 0. By 
stopperedness, there is an H* in HA[T] such that either H* = H' or 
H'<H*. N o w the right hand side tells us that there is an H** in 
HA[S] such that H*<H*\ Clearly, Cn(H**)nS=Q>, and by transi-
tivity, H'<H*\ as desired. N o w suppose that there is a y/in 5 such 
that hi / / . Then we have H' \-y/ for every H'CH, so HA[S] is 
empty. Q . E . D . 
We spare the reader an analogous definition of pick entrench-
ment, and we do not want to enter into a discussion of the proper-
ties of Our first result is that meet contractions of prioritized 
belief bases allow an elegant characterization in terms of bunch 
entrenchment. 
OBSERVATION 3. Let H be a base for K, — he the meet contraction 
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determined by //, and ^ be the relation of bunch entrenchment gen-
erated by H. Then y/eK-^ff) iff [0]«: [0, y/\. 
Proof The trick is to reformulate the principal case of Definition 
2, that is, the case where r/0, in the following way: 
\f/eK^(j) iff 
for every HQH such that H'Wtp and there is no 
H"QH such that H'<H" and / / " b ^ , 
it holds that H'Y-yf iff 
for every H'QH such that /T r /0 and / / ' r f y/ 
there is an H"CH such that H" 
a n d / / " r / 0 iff 
for every 7 / ' e / /A[0 , y/\ there is an 7/"e/ /A[0] 
such that iff 
i /A[0 , y/]«HA[(j)] iff 
[0]«[0, Vl- Q . E . D . 
We can directly represent meet contractions of belief bases as ex-
tended EE-contractions in the following sense. 
DEFINITION 10. For any relation <z of bunch entrenchment, the 
EEE-contraction with respect to <z is given by 
y/eK-^ij) iff y/eK, and [0]<:[0,y/] or 1-0 
Like Definition 6, this definition is connective-free. It relates two 
fundamentally different ideas. If <^  is determined by Definition 9, 
then the condition [0]^[0, y/\ compares ^-maximal subsets 
of H which do not imply 0 with -^-maximal subsets of H which 
imply neither 0 nor yr. In a sense, the definition involves maxi-
choice bunch contraction: yr is in K— 0 iff for every 7 there is a 7' 
such that the maxichoice contraction of K with respect to 0 
determined by H and y' is better than the maxichoice contraction 
of K with respect to 0 and yf determined by H and y On the other 
hand, Definition 10 characterizes meet contraction by single sen-
tences, as shown in Observation 3. 
5. Epistemic entrenchment generated by prioritized belief bases 
Given a prioritized base H for a belief set K, we now try to find a 
more familiar, i.e., non-extended, relation of epistemic entrench-
ment, without beforehand committing ourselves to a certain con-
traction method. 
5.7. Positive relations of "epistemic entrenchment" 
Let us for the sake of simplicity assume in this section that all 
members of H are of equal epistemic value, i.e., that there is no 
prioritization (empty <). A first idea of extracting an epistemic 
entrenchment relation from a base H for a belief set K is the fol-
lowing. Cal l a set H' a proof set for 0 iff H'\-(j). Then yf might be 
called more entrenched than 0 (in K~Cn{H)) if and only if for 
every proof set HQH for 0 there is a proof set H" (111 for yf 
which is "better than" H\ This is a positive interpretation of 
epistemic entrenchment, focussing on the ways to gain a belief. A 
variant of this idea is successful in the reconstruction of "safe con-
tractions" of belief sets with the help of EE-contractions [2, 26]. 
But what does 'better than' mean, if we have no prioritization? 
According to the line of thought developed above, a proof set is 
better than another if it contains fewer explicit beliefs. That is to 
say that H" is better than H' i f H"C H\ So our first idea amounts 
to putting 
0 < y/ iff for every H'QH such that / / ' r -0 there is an / / " 
such that H"CH' and H"Y-y/. 
However, we shall see that this is not the right approach to the 
present problem. The relation defined satisfies (EE1), (EE2 r) and 
(EE21), but neither (EE3 r) nor (EE3 1). The same is true for other 
"positive" suggestions such as the weaker 
<p< yf iff for every H'QH, if / T r - 0 , then H'\-yf, 
and there is an H"CH such that H"\-yf, but H"\i§. 
The main fault of these positive relations is that they do not con-
form to the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment. In order to 
judge the relative entrenchments of 0 and yf in meet contractions 
of belief bases, we have to look at the subsets of H which do not 
entail 0 or yf, rather than at the proof sets for 0 or y/. 
5.2. Epistemic entrenchment from belief bases: 
a negative interpretation 
We return to the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment. As it 
happens, the competitive and the minimal change interpretation of 
it can be unified in the present case. For our official definition, we 
employ the latter one: 
DEFINITION 11. For any prioritized base H for K, the relation of 
epistemic entrenchment generated by H is given by 
0< yf iff H(j) and for every H'CH such that H'Yty/ 
there is an H"QH such that H'<H" and /T ' r /0 . 
This is a singleton version of Definition 9. Clearly, it is a negative 
interpretation of epistemic entrenchment, focussing on the ways to 
discard a belief. It is intuitively well-motivated. Roughly, y/ is 
more entrenched than 0 if and only if for every way of discarding 
yf there is a better way of discarding 0. 
As a special case of Observation 2, we take down 
OBSERVATION 4. Let H be a prioritized base for K, and < be gener-
ated by H. Then (f><yf iff \i<p and for every H'e H Ay/ there is an 
H"e HA<j)such that H<H'\ i.e., iff HAy/«HA<t>*& 
So y/ is more entrenched than 0 i f for every optimal way of dis-
carding y/ there is a still better optimal way of discarding 0. More 
exactly, in terms of maxichoice contraction functions, if for every y 
there is a y ' such that the maxichoice contraction of K with 
respect to <p determined by H and y ' is preferable to the 
maxichoice contraction of K with respect to y/ determined by / / 
and y. 
In the following, we trace some of the implications of Definition 
11. In 5.3, we verify that Definition 11 generates a relation of 
epistemic entrenchment in the generalized sense of Rott [27], but 
not in the standard sense of Gardenfors and Makinson [9]. Next, 
in 5.4, we show that for meet contractions the two interpretations 
of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment coincide. In 5.5, we 
compare Definition 11 with entrenchment relations obtained by 
combining suggestions from Rott [25] with the special preference 
relation < of Section 2. In Section 6.1, we show that meet contrac-
tions, which are EEE-contractions characterized by Definitions 9 
and 10, can be interpolated by means of small and large EE-con-
tractions based on the epistemic entrenchment relation generated 
by the base. Although the approximation cannot in general be 
strengthened to an identity, a perfect agreement can be attained in 
a number of important special cases, as is shown in Section 6.2. 
53. A prioritized belief base generates a generalized, but not a 
standard relation of epistemic entrenchment 
It is easy to verify that the relation < defined in Definition 11 has 
the following properties: 
OBSERVATION 5. For every prioritized belief base H, the relation < 
generated by H satisfies (EE!) - (EE3[) and (EE4) - (EES), but 
it does not satisfy (EE6). 
That is, Definition 11 does not yield an epistemic entrenchment 
relation in the sense of Gardenfors and Makinson [9], but it does 
yield an epistemic entrenchment relation in the less demanding 
sense of Rott [27]. 
Proof (EE1) through (EE3 !) are obvious from Definition 11. 
For (EE3 1), assume that for every H' with H'\iy/ there is an / / " 
with H'<H" and H"H<pAy/. We have to show that for every such 
FF there is an H* with H'<H* and H*\+ty. Now for every such / / ' , 
we have H'WfyAy/. By stopperedness, there is an H* in HA(<pAy/) 
such that either H*=H' or H'<H*. By our assumption and the 
maximality of H\ H*\-y/. Since H*Yt<p Ay/, it follows that H*\+<p. 
For (EE4), observe that for every consistent H, we have HAL = 
{//}, by the maximizing property. So ±<(p means that H is pre-
ferred to every H' in HA (p. For (EE5), observe that 0 < T is equiva-
lent to (p. 
Counterexample to (EE6): The belief base H~{p, pVq, ->pVq} 
with no prioritization (empty <3) has HAp - {{pVq,-1 pVq}}, HAq 
- {{P*PV(]}i {~*PV<]}}' a n d HA(pVq) ~ {{~ ,/?V^r}}. This gives us 
p<pVq, but neitherp<q nor q<pVq. Q . E . D . 
The relation < generated in the counterexample to (EE6) is fur-
ther discussed as Example 1 in Rott [27]. It is worth noting that 
here we have p<pVq although not p<\pVq. Moreover, i f we add q 
to the base H, then the generated entrenchment relation < still 
fails to verify q<p—although we may well have q<\ p. We realize 
once again that prioritization and entrenchment are indeed two 
altogether different kinds of thing. 
If pick contractions are formalized as in Definition 3, Definition 
11 turns out to be tantamount to the first interpretation of the 
basic idea of epistemic entrenchment as formalized in Definition 8. 
In the context of prioritized base contraction, the competitive and 
the minimal change interpretations of epistemic entrenchment co-
incide. 
OBSERVATION 6. (COINCIDENCE LEMMA) Let H be a prioritized base 
for K, let < be the epistemic entrenchment relation generated by H 
and <' be the epistemic entrenchment relation revealed by the pick 
version of multiple meet contraction. Then (j><y/ iff 0 < V -
5.4. The Coincidence Lemma 
Proof 0 < y iff (by Def. 8) 
iff (by Def. 3) 
W \- y/ for every He HA(<t>, y/), and H'Ufy 
iff 
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/ T h y / f o r every 7/ 'e / /A(0, yf), and //A(0, y/)*Q iff 
H'& / / A ( 0 , yf) for every / / ' such that H' \+ yf , and 
h / 0 A yA iff 
/ / ' g HA{(j), y/) for every H'eHAyf, and UfyAyf iff 
for every / / ' € / / A y/ there is an / / " C / / with H'<II" 
and H"y-(j), and b^0A y/ iff 
for every / / 'e / / A I/A there is an / / "e / / A 0 such that 
H'<H", and 0 iff 
H A y / - « / / A 0 a n d r/0 iff (by Def. 11) 
0<y/ Q . E . D . 
Intuitively this result is just what one may expect. It is still inter-
esting, however, because it shows the confluence of two formally 
quite different ideas. As shown in Observation 4, Definition 11 
refers to ^-maximal non-implying subsets, i.e., to maxichoice con-
tractions with respect to 0 and yf, but multiple contractions are 
not involved. On the other hand, Definitions 3 and 8 analyze 
epistemic entrenchment in terms of meet pick contractions (which 
could, however, also be presented as meet singleton contractions 
with respect to 0 A y / ) . 
5.5. More ways to generate the relation of epistemic entrenchment 
There are still more ways to arrive at the determination of 
epistemic entrenchment given by Definition 11. We follow a line of 
reasoning that has been proposed in the context of theory contrac-
tion. 
5.5.1. First let us combine Rott's [25] way of constructing 
epistemic entrenchment from a preference relation over maximal 
non-implying subsets of theories with an understanding of 'better' 
as 'preserving more important beliefs'. 
According to Definition 5 of [25], 0<y/ if and only if for all 
K'eKl yf there is a K"e Kl0 which is at least as good as ^ '(re-
member that Kl 0 is the set of all inclusion maximal subsets of K 
that do not imply 0). For the transition from < to < we take the 
converse complement. So 0< yf if and only if there is a K"e Kl<j) 
such that all K"e Kl i/Aare worse than K'.n But this is not yet sat-
isfactory. Because we must allow for the possibility of elements in 
M(K)-\J {Kl x'Xe & - Cn(($)} which are incomparable with re-
spect to the preference relation under consideration, this condition 
seems too demanding. We should rearrange the quantifier phrases 
from 3 V to V 3 . 1 4 Our official proposal then is this: 
0 < yr iff \i<j) and for all K' e Kl yf there is a 
K"eKl<j) which is better than K\ 
N o w we recall the basic idea of prioritized base contraction: For 
sets K' and K" of sentences (in M(Kj), K" is better than K\ in 
symbols K'<K \ iff there is a level of priority in the base H such 
that at this level K" exceeds K\ while at every higher level K" is at 
least as comprehensive as K\ 
It should be noted that •< so defined is not a preference relation 
of the kind discussed in [25], because it is not modular, i.e., its con-
verse complement does not satisfy transitivity. Putting the last two 
definitions together, we have a new characterization of epistemic en-
trenchment which turns out to be equivalent to Definition 11. 
OBSERVATION 7. Let H be a prioritized base for K Then the 
following two conditions are equivalent: 
(i) for every Ke Klyf there is a K"e Kl<f)such that K'<K", 
(ii) for every H'eHAyf there is an H"eHAfysuch that H' < H'\ 
1 3 I am cheating a little at this point. I substitute 'worse than' for 'not at least as 
good as1—a move which would obviously require connectivity for the relation 'at 
least as good as'. 
1 4 For reasons which cannot be explained here, I now believe that a reversal of the 
quantifier phrases in Rott [25] is more adequate anyway. 
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Proof, (i) implies (ii): Let H'eHAy/CHly/. Extend 77' to a set 
K'eKly/. This is possible and gives us K' n / / = / / ' . Take a K" 
from (i) and put H"' - K"nH. Since K'< K", we get H'<H"\ by 
base-specificity. Furthermore, we have H'CH and H"'Yt 0. So by 
stopperedness, there is an H" in HA(j) such that H"'<H" or 
H'"-H'\ By transitivity, H'<H", as desired. 
(ii) implies (i): Let KeKly/, and put H" = K'C\H. We have H"' 
CHand H'"\+yr. So by stopperedness, there is an / / ' i n / / A y / s u c h 
that H"'<H' or H"'~H\ Take an / / " from (ii). By transitivity, 
H'"<H'\ Extend 77"€ 7/A0 C / / ± 0 to a set K"e Kl(/>. This is pos-
sible and gives us K"nH=H". Since K'nH= H"'<H"= K'nH, 
we get, by base-specificity, K'<K'\ as desired. Q . E . D . 
5.5.2 There is also a method to derive epistemic entrenchment 
from a preference relation over arbitrary sets of sentences. Accord-
ing to [25, Lemma 2(iii)], 0<y/ if and only if for all sets S such 
that S H yf there is a T such that T H 0 and T is at least as good as 
S. N o w let us take the converse of complement and adjust the 
quantifier arrangement in a way similar to the previous section. 
What we get is 
0< y^iff h/0 and for all sets S such that SHy/ there is a T 
such that TUty and T is better than S. 
Combining this with an understandig of'better' as > ' , we discover 
yet another equivalent form of Definition 11: 
OBSERVATION 8. Let H be a prioritized base for K. Then the fol-
lowing two conditions are equivalent: 
(i) for every S such that SHy/ there is a T such that TH<p and 
S<T, 
(ii) for every H'CH such that H'Myf there is an H'QH such 
that Hf,y-(t>and H'<H'\ 
Proof, (i) implies (ii): Take H"-TC\H and apply base-specificity, 
(ii) implies (i): Put H'=SnH, take T-H" and apply base-speci-
ficity. Q . E . D . 
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6. Prioritized base contractions as approximated by 
epistemic entrenchment contractions 
Suppose that the epistemic entrenchment relation < is generated 
by the prioritized belief base H for K. We wonder about the rela-
tion between the meet contractions generated by H on the one 
hand and the large and small EE-contractions based on < on the 
other. Is it possible to get what we got by extended epistemic 
entrenchment above (Observation 3) with the help of singleton 
epistemic entrenchment? As for large EE-contractions, the answer 
must be negative, because they are known to satisfy the recovery 
postulate, which base contractions notoriously do not. 
6.1. The Interpolation Lemma 
It turns out that singleton epistemic entrenchment is insufficient in 
general, but an approximation by upper and lower bounds is pos-
sible. The entrenchment relation determined by a belief base H 
with the help of Definition 11 allows us to follow the above-men-
tioned recommendation of Lindstrom and Rabinowicz. We can 
interpolate meet changes according to Definition 2, i.e., E E E -
changes according to Definitions 9 and 10, by means of large and 
small EE-changes according to Definitions 5 and 6. 
OBSERVATION 9 (INTERPOLATION LEMMA). Let H be a prioritized 
base for K and < be the entrenchment relation generated by H. Fur-
thermore, let — be the meet contraction function determined by H, 
let —f be the small and —, be the large EE-contraction with respect 
to <. Then 
K^x<p C K^(j) C K^2(p . 
The converse inclusions are not valid, even if there is no prioriti-
zation. 
Proof Let H, K and < be as indicated. If I— </>, there is nothing to 
prove because then K— (j) = K by definition in every case. So let 
and y/e K. Unravelling the definitions, we find that 
y/e K^- 0 
y/e K^-2<p 
iff HAy/«HA<t> 
iff 7/A[0,y/] « HA[<t)] 
iff HA(<j)Vy/) « HA<p 
(I) 
(H) 
(HI) 
But now we see that our claim is obvious because by 
stopperedness, every ^-maximal subset W of H which does not 
imply 0 V yf is identical with or ^(-dominated by some ^-maximal 
subset H" of H which implies neither 0 nor yf, and every such H" 
is in turn identical with or ^-dominated by some ^-maximal subset 
H'" of H which does not imply yf. 
The converse inclusions are not valid, even if we assume that 
there is no prioritization: If H~ {p, q} and <3 is empty, then 
qeK^p according to (II), but not according to (I). If H- {pAq, 
pVq) and < is empty, then qeK—p according to (III), but not 
according to (II). (Notice that if H- {p, pVq}, the absurd result 
qeK—p according to (III) is avoided by the requirement that q be 
contained already in K- Cn(H).) Intuitively, the meet contraction 
according to (II) gives the desired results. Q . E . D . 
In a couple of important cases, the correspondence between meet 
contractions and epistemic entrenchment contractions is perfect, if 
the latter are to mean large EE-contractions based on the relation 
< generated by the prioritized belief base H. There are at least 
three ways to obtain an equivalence: when a prioritized belief base 
is logically closed, when a contraction function is blown up so as 
to guarantee the recovery property, and when a contraction is 
used only as an intermediate step in bringing about a belief revi-
sion. 
6.2.1. Closed bases. The first case is when the base H is already 
a belief set, i.e., when H-K. Then (II) and (III) turn out to be 
equivalent for every yf in K. We already know that (II) implies 
(III). Suppose for reductio that (III) is true and (II) is false. From 
the latter we know by stopperedness and transitivity that there is a 
K' in KA[(f),yf] for which there is no better set not implying 0. Thus 
K' is in KA$. By (III), Kr cannot be in A'A(0Vi//) . So since every 
6.2. Perfect agreements 
set preferred to Kf implies 0 V y/, A " h 0 v y / . But also 0—>y/ e K\ by 
K'e KA(j)C Kl(j) and yr eK~K'.]5 7/ence K' HI/A, contradicting 
K'eKA[<j),y/]. 
If there is no prioritization, i.e., i f <l is empty and -< is C , this 
case is of limited relevance. Then the epistemic entrenchment rela-
tion generated by K is nearly empty if AT is a theory, because then 
K'eK Ay/= ATI y^  and K"e KA<j) = Kl 0 imply K'<tK".x(> So in 
this case, <p<y/ according to Definition 11 can hold only if either 
y/e K and 0 £ K, or h y/ and H 0. Similarly, for theories K without 
prioritization, (I) is only possible i f either y/eK and <j)Ayf<£ K, or 
hy/, and (III) is only possible if either (f)Vy/eK and 0 g A ,^ or 
h 0 V y / . This corresponds to a well-known trivialization result of 
Alchourron and Makinson [1, Observation 2.1] for full meet con-
tractions of theories. However, i f a theory is genuinely prioritized, 
the construction offered is perfectly reasonable. 
6.2.2. Nebel's blown-up contractions. The second case in point is 
when a meet contraction is supplemented with a mechanism to 
enforce the recovery postulate. This is basically the suggestion of 
Nebel [20]: 
DEFINITION 12. For any prioritized base H for K, the blown-up meet 
contraction — is given by 
y/eK^<j> iff ( A ^ , 0 ) U { 0 — / / } hy/, where A>,0 
is the meet contraction determined by H. 
The set Rec- { 0 — : X eH) I S a recovery ticket which allows 
one to "undo" a base contraction with respect to 0. It is easy to 
check that on Definition 12, K - (K— 0 ) + 0, for every 0 in K. But 
since clearly 0 implies every element of Rec, and Rec in turn 
implies 0—^y/((or every y/in K), we find that y/e AT—0 according 
to Definition 12 iff 0 V y^ G AT—0 according to Definition 2. Com-
paring (II) with (III) and realizing that / / A [ 0 , 0 V y / ] ~ / / A ( 0 V y/), 
we see that this is the same as y/e AT—0 according to Definitions 5 
1 5 See footnote 5. 
1 6 Unless K" equals K. Cf. footnote 5. 
and 11. So Nebel's variation on meet contractions is captured ex-
actly by large EE-contractions based on the relation < generated 
by// . 
6.2.3. Revisions based on the Levi identity. Thirdly, the corre-
spondence is perfect i f a contraction is only an intermediate for a 
revision constructed with the help of the Levi identity. Since, by 
Levi and the deduction theorem, y/is in K* <p iff <p—>t//is in K^^tp, 
we have to check K— ~^<p only for sentences of the form 0—• y/. But 
clearly, for every relation < satisfying (EE2 1), - - 0 < (<t>-^y/) is 
equivalent to - ^ 0 < - > 0 V ( 0 — • (//), so Definitions 5 and 6 are equiva-
lent for sentences of the form 0 — ^ i n K — Hence, by the Inter-
polation Lemma, both large and small EE-revisions are identical 
with the meet revision determined by / / . ' 7 
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has not been to present exciting new technical 
results. It is rather meant to provide one more illustration for the 
versatility of the concept of epistemic entrenchment in the rational 
reconstruction of belief change. To the best of our knowledge, we 
have offered one of the first suggestions how to apply epistemic 
entrenchment to belief states ("bases") which are not supposed to be 
logically closed (compare Dubois and Prade [4]) but which may be 
partitioned into various levels of priority. We also hope to have 
furthered the intuitive understanding of epistemic entrenchment and 
its relation to multiple contraction. 
Our starting point has been a fixed prioritized belief base / / . It 
contains the reasoner's explicit beliefs of various strengths and 
generates a belief set K~Cn(H). Our concern is "syntax-based" 
belief change, or belief change determined by belief bases, and we 
assume that it is the syntactical structure and the epistemic weight-
ing of the explicit beliefs that governs the changes of K. 
We have given a reformulation of meet contractions determined 
by a prioritized belief base as extended EE-contractions: Defini-
tion 2 is equivalent to the combination of Definitions 9 and 10. 
Presumably because of the problems with the recovery postulate, NebeEs atten-
tion switches from contractions in [20] to revisions in [21]. 
This representation depends on an extension of the concept of 
epistemic entrenchment to sets of sentences ("bunch entrench-
ment"). We elaborated on the basic idea of epistemic entrench-
ment as comparative retractability by giving it two different read-
ings. The usual "competitive" interpretation was distinguished 
from what we called the "minimal change interpretation" of the 
phrase 'y/is harder to discard than </>'. 
We proposed a method of extracting an epistemic entrenchment 
relation < from a prioritized belief base H. Discovering that Defi-
nition 11 is equivalent to the combination of Definitions 3 and 8, 
we observed a confluence of the two interpretations of epistemic 
entrenchment (the "Coincidence Lemma"). It was demonstrated 
that for every meet contraction determined by a prioritized base H 
one can specify upper and lower bounds in the form of large and 
small EE-contractions based on the relation < generated by H (the 
"Interpolation Lemma"). In a number of interesting cases, this re-
sult can be sharpened to an identity. Nebel [21, Theorem 9] proved 
that an epistemic entrenchment relation < can be applied as if it 
were a belief base prioritization <l. We have offered an answer to 
the reverse question: Given some belief base prioritized by <l, is it 
possible to exhibit a natural relation of entrenchment < such that 
the EE-contraction with respect to < leads to the same results as 
the meet contraction with respect to <3? 
Since the publication of Gardenfors's Knowledge in Flux, rela-
tions of epistemic entrenchment have been known to be 
interdefinable with belief contractions. For theory change by sin-
gletons, the following transitions are standard in the literature: 
(jxy/ iff y/eK—(QAifland <l> 2 K—(<l>Ay/) 
y/e K — <p iff y/e K, and 0 < </> V y / o r h 0 
To my mind, there is no denying that these bridge principles are 
the pivotal points of an illuminating and well-developed theory of 
belief change [7, 9, 25, 26, 27]. In our particular framework where 
everything starts from a prioritized belief base, one can prove that 
the principles hold, but only approximately in some cases. In order 
to bring this out as clear as possible, we adopt the following 
notation. For any prioritized belief base / / , let C{H) and 2T(//)be 
the contraction operation and the entrenchment relation derived 
from H by Definitions 2 and 11 respectively. Moreover, if < is an 
entrenchment relation and — is a contraction function, let C ' (<) 
and !(—) denote the contraction function and the entrenchment 
relation obtained by the above bridge principles (which are identi-
cal with our Definitions 5 and 7). Finally, let C (<) denote the 
small EE-contraction with respect to <. 
We are now in a position to formulate the following summary 
of relationships: 
OBSERVATION 10. Let H be a prioritized belief set and let — - C(H) 
and< - T(H). Then 
(a) Z ( - ) = <, 
(b) C " ( < ) C - C C W 
(c) W ) ) C - C C m 
(d) £ ( C "(<)) = < = £(C+(<) ) . 
Proof (a) is the Coincidence Lemma, and (b) is the Interpolation 
Lemma; (c) follows from (a) and (b): C~(X(^)) = C (T(C(If))) = 
(by (a)) C{T(H)) Q (by (b)) C{H) C (by (b) C '(Tiff)) £ (by (a)) 
C+(1(C(H))) = C\T(^))\ for (d), let <' - T(C (<)) and <" = 
1(C +(<)). Then, by definition, 0 < ' y/ iff7 <f> A y < y/ and 0 A y/ < 0 . 
Similarly, 0 < " yf iff 0 A I / A < ( 0 A I / A ) V y/ and 0AI/A i t ( 0 A ^ ) V 0 . 
Both of these conditions reduce to 0<y, by Observation 5 and 
( E E l ) - ( E E 3 ' ) . Q . E . D . 
This shows that the bridge principles of Gardenfors and 
Makinson get the transitions quite right, provided that both the 
contraction operation and the entrenchment relation are deter-
mined by a fixed belief base. The agreement is perfect in the case 
of entrenchment relations and only approximate in the case of 
contraction operations. Parts (c) and (d) to some extent reproduce 
the nice results of Gardenfors and Makinson [9, Corollary 6]. 
However, it is hard to make intuitive sense of the occurrences of 
For any two contraction functions —, and —, over K< —, C — i s of course 
short for "K—{<p C K—,<j> for every <jT. 
fcA' and fcV' in the above bridge principles. This is why I suggest a 
more transparent way to think of the interdefinability between 
epistemic entrenchment and belief change. 
<t><yf iff ^ € / L —(0, y/) and (0, y^) (Definit ions) 
M ^ r base specialization: i f ~ is the meet contraction de-
termined by a prioritized base H, then, by Observations 4 
and 6, 0 < y/ is definable by HA y/ • « / / A 0 
Singleton reformulation: in so far as K~{<p,yf) is identical 
with K^-(<pAy/), 0 < y if and only if y/eK— ( 0 A y / ) and 
0 £ K^(<j)A yf) 
y/eK—<l> iff and [ 0 ] ^ [ 0 , y / ] or h 0 (Definition 10) 
Meet base specialization: i f is the bunch entrenchment 
generated by a prioritized base H, then, by Observation 
3, meet contraction determined by H coincides with E E E -
contraction, and yfeK—cpis definable by HA[(p,yf]^< 
/ / A [ 0 ] 
Singleton interpolation: in so far as <p<yf implies [0]<^ 
[0, yf], and this in turn implies 0 < 0 V I / A , large and small 
EE-contractions can serve as upper and lower bounds of 
EEE-contractions (Observation 9) 
Our deviation from the standard account is clear. We invoke sets 
with two elements as arguments for contraction operations and 
entrenchment relations. More specifically, we replace, in the 
direction from belief change to epistemic entrenchment, the con-
tractions with respect to conjunctions by pick contractions, and in 
the direction from epistemic entrenchment to belief change, the en-
trenchments of disjunctions by bunch entrenchments. 
What is the reward for this exercise? First and foremost, we get 
a better understanding of the relevant interrelations. They some-
times happen to reduce to the standard definitions. But what is 
really meant by the latter is, I submit, precisely what is made ex-
plicit by the new definitions. In one direction, I should think there 
is virtually no difference: AT—(0Ay/ ) appears to be intuitively 
indistinguishable from K—((j),y/}. In the other direction, however, 
it is only the restricted context of theory change by singletons that 
makes our new definition reduce to the old one: [01^10, y] may — 
and must!—then be identified with 0 < 0 V y. 
Secondly, we manage without reference to any particular con-
nective of the object language. Thus the theory of epistemic en-
trenchment becomes applicable to systems using a severely re-
stricted language. For instance, we can speak of the entrenchment 
of the nodes in inheritance nets or reason maintenance systems 
(also called "truth maintenance systems"). There ought to be a 
corresponding connective-free formulation of the so-called 
Gardenfors postulates for contraction operations [7, Section 3.4]. 
The obvious suggestion is to replace occurrences of "K — (0Ay/)' by 
'K—^yf. The elimination of connectives, however, works only 
for belief contractions. Belief revisions constructed according to 
the Levi identity make use of negations, and there does not seem 
to be a straightforward way to avoid this. 
At last, we should like to give two warnings. The connective-
free formulation of the theory of epistemic entrenchment relations 
and theory contractions is only a by-product of this paper, slightly 
improving on the presentation in [27]. It is not necessary for the 
analysis of syntax-based belief change which turns essentially on 
the syntactical structure of the items in a belief base. There is no 
immediate transfer of insights from belief base update to updates 
in inheritance networks or reason maintenance systems (RMSs) 
with their unstructured "nodes". It may be expedient for some 
purposes to identify R M S "justifications" with Horn clauses. But 
this certainly does not suffice for nonmonotonic systems. Our Cn 
is supposed to be monotonic. 
Multiple contraction and extended epistemic entrenchment have 
been found to be an appropriate means for analyzing base con-
traction. However—and this is the second warning—, the con-
cepts of multiple contraction and extended epistemic entrench-
ment themselves, cut loose from the special context of contraction 
functions determined by prioritized belief bases, are still very 
much in need of a thoroughgoing analysis. This is evidently 
beyond the scope of the present paper. 
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